Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work p...
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| Language: | English |
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Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer,
2013.
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| Edition: | 1st ed. 2013. |
| Series: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
668 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7 |
| Summary: | A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods. |
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| Physical Description: | XV, 168 p. 27 illus. online resource. |
| ISBN: | 9783642358227 |
| ISSN: | 0075-8442 ; |